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This edition of the Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology carries an article by Judith Buckingham dedicated to discrediting my criminology and, via me, the PhD thesis of my former student, Samantha Jeffries. Inter alia, I am accused of hijacking the public consciousness of New Zealand through a dominating presence in the news media, of negatively influencing the Jeffries PhD, and of writing a book called Crime in New Zealand which erroneously depicts women’s role in domestic violence and their treatment by the criminal justice system. In this response to Buckingham’s attack, I argue that she has made unsupportable claims in relation to my influence in the news media, has completely misunderstood Jeffries’s thesis, has distorted, misreported, misconstrued and misrepresented the content of Crime in New Zealand, and has accused me of making errors when a check of the facts shows that the errors are her own. She has given false meanings to things I have said and defaced me by focussing on small, decontextualised, fragments of writing and ignoring the bulk of my work.

Address for correspondence: Greg Newbold, Associate Professor, School of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Canterbury, Pte Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand.
The Buckingham article is an odd one in that it attempts a number of things which appear to have little to do with one another. Essentially, the piece is a lengthy, albeit disjointed, attack on me and some of my criminology and I must say at the outset that I find it perplexing, especially given the many mistakes and misconstructions it contains, that the Journal would see fit to print it. However the editorial decision has been made and I am grateful for the chance to reply.
	Buckingham’s critique has three principal aspects to it:

1. I am criticised for some of the comments that I have made, or that have been attributed to me, by New Zealand news media.
2. I am criticised about some of the content of a book I wrote in 2000 entitled, Crime in New Zealand.
3. I am criticised in relation to the findings of a PhD thesis that I supervised between 1997 and 2001, which was written by Samantha Jeffries.

Hijacking the Media
The general thrust of the criticism is that some of my criminology unfairly and erroneously depicts women in relation to gender symmetry in domestic violence and women in the criminal justice system. One area in which I am alleged to have committed this sin is through a dominating presence in the New Zealand news media. 
It is true that, for various reasons, I enjoy a high public profile in New Zealand as a criminologist, but Buckingham flatters me in crediting me with “the remarkable capture of New Zealand media and popular discourses on issues of domestic violence and gender inequality”. Certainly she provides no evidence to support such a grand claim. If she reads the papers, listens to the radio or watches television, she will see that there is no overriding voice in this area. There are many others: feminist groups, Women’s Refuge, Rape Crisis, Stopping Violence Services, the Police Association, the Office of the Police Commissioner, politicians, judges, criminal lawyers, talkback hosts, and others, who comment regularly on such matters and generate healthy debate. It is extravagant, too, to say that I have “animated public opinion with [my] analysis of female offending”, although I would be delighted if this were the case. 
The truth is far less auspicious. Buckingham supports her argument of media domination by citing just eight newspaper articles that have quoted me since 1996 on matters relating to gender bias in sentencing, and female violence. During that time frame I have been quoted more than 600 times in the media on a wide range of criminological issues; occasionally to do with women’s offending. But women’s concerns have hardly been central to mine, and my comments have mostly been based on the reported research of others. My main field of expertise is corrections and Buckingham’s eight snippets represent only a tiny percentage of the remarks I have made on a wide range of topics. Sometimes I say things that some people regard as contentious, and now and then I am asked about women, but I would never credit myself with hijacking the consciousness of the nation on any topic, much less one that is of peripheral interest to me.
Buckingham makes the same exaggerations when she attacks my book, Crime in New Zealand. She says, “A dominant feature of this work, and the subsequent research for which it provided the model [ie, Samantha Jeffries’s PhD], is a reliance on small bites of decontextualised data which are generalised as representative of sentencing standards or principles”. 
This is pure nonsense. First, Jeffries’s research was in the final writing-up stage when Crime in New Zealand was published. So Crime in New Zealand could not possibly have provided the ‘model’ for Jeffries’s study. Second, it is completely untrue and mischievous to say that Jeffries’s study was based on “small bites of decontextualised data, etc”. Her findings were based on carefully controlled samples backed by a highly sophisticated statistical instrument. I will return to this matter presently, but I wonder whether Buckingham ever read the thesis. 
Third, it is also untrue to say that these “small bites of decontextualised data” are a “dominant feature” of Crime in New Zealand, or, as she claims in the next paragraph, that “throughout the text” I deal with female offenders by relying on “discredited stereotytpes of women” (whatever that means) and “emotive appeals to popular prejudices” (whatever they may be) … “as evidence of bias in criminal justice processes”. In fact, this book is 279 pages long. It carries nine chapters dealing with subjects as diverse as property crime, sex crime, violent crime, drug offending, organised crime and sources of judicial miscarriage. There is one chapter on women’s offending generally and odd references to aspects of female criminality elsewhere. The only point where I deal specifically with judicial inequalities in relation to gender is at pp.65-74. That represents just 3.2 percent of the total text. Whatever Buckingham thinks of the arguments on these few pages, they could never be construed as a “dominant feature” of the book, nor are these positions taken “throughout the text”. Notably, Buckingham’s vitriol against my comments in this area is confined to just four pages of the entire book, that is: pp.70-73.                
	
The Jeffries Research
Buckingham’s next task is to attempt to discredit the PhD thesis of Samantha Jeffries, which I co-supervised. Buckingham herself is a PhD student, and again I am surprised by the Journal’s decision to publish this material. An international refereed periodical seems hardly the proper forum for a PhD student to assail the doctorate of somebody else, in fact I think it is entirely inapproriate. 
Precisely what Jeffries’s PhD has to do with me and why Buckingham has chosen to include it in her attack on my work, is a mystery. I have made comments in the media based on Jeffries’s findings, and have drawn attention to it in Crime in New Zealand, but the thesis isn’t mine. The work belongs to Samantha Jeffries and so does the credit. At the time of writing Jeffries and I have published nothing together, and I have published no research of my own in this area. Jeffries, Fletcher and I have an article forthcoming in Criminology which is taken from Jeffries’s PhD findings, but Buckingham hasn’t seen this. Instead, she has chosen to draw inference from a draft of preliminary results that Jeffries and I put together in 1991, which has never been published and of which I no longer even have a copy.
	A full response to Buckingham’s critique of Jeffries’s research, by Jeffries, accompanies this article. However for my part I will say that as her primary supervisor, my main concerns were twofold: (1) to ensure that Jeffries’s methodology was sound; (2) to ensure that she drew reasonable conclusions from her results. I had nothing to do with the findings per se. Jeffries’s methodology was strong and her statistical analyses, ably assisted by Professor Garth Fletcher of the Psychology Department at Canterbury University, were highly sophisticated. Jeffries’s findings were consonant with those of many well-known international studies (see literature reviews in Daly and Bordt, 1995; Nagel and Hagan, 1983; and Parisi, 1982. See also Triggs, 1999). Although not uncontested, such studies have found that even when relevant sentencing factors are held constant, significant differences remain between women’s and men’s chances of being sent to prison and/or in the length of the sentences they receive. 
In correcting many of the methodological and analytical flaws that marred Deane’s (1997) investigation into the same area, Jeffries’s work remains the most thorough and reliable study of the impact of gender on sentencing that is available in this country. Indeed, it must stand among the most robust pieces of research of its type to have been conducted anywhere. As Buckingham may find when she submits her own dissertation, no research is perfect and beyond criticism. However the power of Jeffries’s study was affirmed in the examiners’ reports of two of the world’s most eminent feminist criminologists: Professor Meda Chesney-Lind of the University of Hawaii, and Professor Nicole Hahn-Rafter of Northeastern University, MA. I make no apology for using this fine piece of research to support comments I have made in relation to evident gender bias in the sentencing practices of New Zealand courts.

The Attack on Crime in New Zealand
After attacking Jeffries, Buckingham returns her attention to me, and resumes her critique of some of the material contained in Crime in New Zealand. Jeffries confined her analysis to three types of offending: drugs, property and violence, and explained the statistical disparities she found by observing from court files that judges and probation officers tend to pathologise women’s criminal behaviour, or find other reasons such as victimisation of the perpetrator or her domestic role, to justify smaller sentences than would otherwise be expected. 
In an attempt to illustrate how this same process may extend to the very serious area of child abuse, in Crime in New Zealand (pp.70-72) I have given 15 instances where women committed very serious crimes against children, but for various reasons received surprisingly light penalties. Often they avoided imprisonment altogether and frequently the victimhood or pathology of the perpetrator was cited as a mitigating factor. Because most of the cases I used were unreported I had no ready access to the judges’ sentencing notes and was forced to rely on newspaper files. I attempted no statistical or detailed analysis of these cases and the examples were obviously included for their illustrative (not probative) value (as Buckingham claims). 
She spends some time focussing one of my examples, that of R v. Teinatoa (1993) 10 CRNZ 288, in which a woman was sentenced to two years probation for the attempted murder of her partner. The reason imprisonment was avoided in this case was that the male victim had forgiven the accused and married her, and that the pair had an eight year-old daughter who was suffering from a potentially fatal illness and needed her mother’s care. This is one of the few cases that have been reported and reading the judgment it is easy to see the court’s rationale. Still I wonder whether the outcome would have been the same had the gender roles been reversed. 
In any event, these cases I have cited are no conclusive proof of anything, but they do show similar tendencies to those Jeffries discovered. In rebuttal, Buckingham provides four examples of men getting light sentences for serious child abuse, but she makes no attempt to contextualise the offences or explain why the terms were so light. It may indeed be that where crimes against children are concerned, the factors that influence differential sentencing of men and women in other areas, are absent. The proof of this one way or another, awaits future inquiry.
Buckingham’s next line of attack is to accuse me of producing a “wildly inaccurate account of data contained in a newspaper report”. The report she refers to involved the case of a woman who had admitted assisting her stepbrother to beat her toddler son for wetting the bed, and received a sentence of three months periodic detention with 18 months supervision. Buckingham asserts not only that I got the facts wrong, but says in a footnote that I got the newspaper citation wrong as well. 
It appears not to have occurred to her that the true reason for the discrepancy in newspaper dates is that we are referring to two different articles. The one I used was published in the Dominion newspaper on 20 October 1997 under the title, ‘The Tragedy of Abused Children’. The facts in it are as I reported them on p.72 of Crime in New Zealand, except that I did not mention the stepbrother’s alleged involvement because he had pleaded not guilty at the time and had yet to be tried. The article Buckingham used was published in the same paper a month earlier, under the title, ‘PD, Supervision for Bashing Son’. In her article, Buckingham accepts the guilt of the stepbrother even though he had denied involvement. Moreover, she misreports her own source by saying that the woman had been sentenced on the basis that she had failed to protect her child from her stepbrother. This is quite incorrect and her source, The Dominion 20 September 1997, says nothing of the kind. The article states plainly that the woman had pleaded guilty to wilfully ill-treating and assaulting the boy.  
But it matters little either way because the case is a perfect illustration of the point I was making about extenuating circumstances being accepted for women that would be unlikely to succeed for men. The assaults that this woman participated in occurred over a six-week period, some beatings lasted for more than 20 minutes, and involved the infant being thrown against a wall, among other things. As Jeffries found was so common in her sample, the woman was pathologised and given victim status by the psychologists’ report, and she was largely absolved of responsibility for her crime. It was accepted that a ‘dreadful’ upbringing, and an early pregnancy had resulted in her thinking that slapping was an appropriate response to bedwetting. Moreover, according to the psychologists, her upbringing also produced a state of ‘dissociation’, whereby she was powerless to do anything about the baby’s abuse because she saw herself as the baby and her brother as the adult figures who had abused her in her own childhood. This confusing scenario was accepted by the judge and it was on this basis that the woman avoided imprisonment.              
               Next, on p.73 of Crime in New Zealand, Buckingham critiques my handling of the case of Stewart Murray Wilson (49), the so-called, ‘Beast of Blenheim’, who in March 1996 was sentenced to 21 years’ imprisonment on 22 counts of sexually and physically abusing 21 women over a 20-year period. As I have acknowledged, this was a terrible case and the sentence was no less than just, but what is interesting about it is that none of the women who colluded with Wilson was charged with any offence. However, their involvement was considerable. While he was living with a de facto partner Wilson had forced his young daughter, semi-clothed, unwashed, and at times covered in urine, to eat regularly with the family cats. His partner did nothing to stop this. He had sex with a woman on a table while her children were eating at it, forced a woman to have sex regularly with a dog, and raped an eight year-old girl in front of her mother. Yet nobody went to the police. One woman who came to stay with Wilson and his wife for a ‘holiday’ said that Wilson and his wife sexually molested her and had been present when Wilson force-fed her (the visitor) sedatives, beat her, abused her, and had sex with her on numerous occasions against her will. But she remained there and nobody laid a complaint. Wilson once drugged and raped a Danish tourist in front of his wife, who did nothing. One woman admitted marrying Wilson, even though she and Wilson were both married at the time. She was never charged. She also repeatedly had sex with Wilson in front of her children. (At a later date and in an unrelated incident, this same woman killed her other husband by slashing his throat and was sentenced to life imprisonment).
	I concur on p.73 that Wilson was an extremely aggressive and manipulative man and his activities were unforgivable. But although many of his victims denounced him at trial, at the time of the offences they complied with him and did nothing to stop him, nor did they remove themselves or their children from the extraordinarily destructive situation they were in. Moreover, on the basis that they were frightened of Wilson and under his control, none of the women involved in the case faced any charges. In other words, and conforming to Jeffries’s findings, they were given the status of victims and not held responsible for anything they did or did not do. 
I found this remarkable. Buckingham did not. In her article she becomes an apologist for women who fail to take steps to protect their children from chronic abuse and describes my analysis of Wilson as part of a “simplistic account of the complex dynamics of violent relationships … in which battered men are counterposed as equivalent victims of domestic violence”. I am fully aware of these dynamics and they are traversed in my most recent book, The Girls in the Gang, which I co-wrote with Glennis Dennehy in 2001. But in the current case, the offences went on for 20 years. There were (at least) 21 women and children involved. Many of the women participated in what went on and nobody did anything. None of the women were even prosecuted. I followed the case closely at the time and to me, the decision not to lay charges against any other person was indeed extraordinary, and a fine example of Jeffries’s explanation of female victim-status as a mitigating factor in the criminal justice process.
	
Violence Between Intimates: Who Bashes Who?
Buckingham’s final angle of attack involves violence between intimates. In this lengthy section she questions a comment I made on p.59 of Crime in New Zealand relating to the large body of research showing that women in intimate relationships are just as likely to assault their partners as the reverse. In particular, I cite Magdol et al. (1997), whose paper is based on the Dunedin Multidisciplinary Health and Development’s Study’s longitudinal survey of 1,032 children born in 1972 and 1973. This found that 37.2 percent of the women interviewed admitted committing minor violence towards a partner compared with 21.8 percent of the men, and that 18.6 percent of the women had committed serious violence against a partner compared with 5.7 percent of the men. Confirming these results, 12.7 percent of the women said they had been victims of severe violence from a partner, compared with 21.2 percent of the men. 
	These results are similar to those from a large number of international studies (eg. Berliner, 1990; Bograd, 1990; Makepeace, 1986; McNeely and Mann, 1990; O’Leary et al., 1989; Straus and Gelles, 1986; Steinmetz 1977-78. See also Dobash and Dobash, 1992 for a review of research).
Buckingham produces a range of surveys that show differences in the nature and frequency of male and female violence rates; specifically citing a paper by Langley, Martin and Nada-Raja (1997), based on the same sample that Magdol et al. used, which indicates significantly higher rates of male violence than female. Langley et al. try to explain the disparity by pointing out that they used a different survey technique to Magdol et al. and by suggesting that women may be more willing to report violence against themselves than men. Moreover, women may be more likely to categorise minor assault as violence than men (p.682). So the perceived differences could well be artificial.  
I agree with Buckingham that different survey methods can produce different results and that no survey is flawless. Irrespective of who attacks who the most, however, self-reported family conflict research shows abundantly that women do it a lot more often than for what they are commonly given credit. I also agree with Buckingham that it is important to identify the context and severity of the violence that takes place. In fact I have commented extensively on this in a damning review that I wrote of Leibrich, Paulin and Ransom’s (1995) report of male domestic violence in New Zealand (see Newbold, 1995). It is also clear that irrespective of who hits who first, men, because of their superior strength, tend to do the most damage. Women are injured by men a lot more than the reverse. 
I am unsure why Buckingham has chosen to make such an issue of this, because the problem of male violence towards women is something to which I have devoted considerable attention. In Crime in New Zealand there is an entire section on domestic violence (pp.120-129) which is dominated by discussion of male violence towards women and measures that have been taken to combat it. Moreover, preceding my consideration of the Magdol et al. findings I state quite clearly, “it is true that women are more often the victims of injurious spouse-beating than men” (p.59), and on the next page I refer to the superior strength of men and the greater damage they cause. I comment, at pp.60 and 150, on the fact that 90 percent of murderers are male. I also discuss the violence that men commit against women and the nature of unequal power relationships, in my large section on rape and sexual violation (pp.129-143). My last book (Dennehy and Newbold, 2001) focuses heavily on female oppression in the domestic context and the psychological enthralment that frequently results. In a recent article in Police Quarterly, Butler, Winfree and I (2003) have investigated gender disparities in the New Zealand Police.  
Buckingham studiously ignores all of this, and caricaturises me as a biased, masculinist, bigot with little awareness of, or sensitivity towards, women’s issues. She even goes as far as attributing meanings to my work that are not there. On p.129 of Crime in New Zealand, where I comment on the “potential for abuse by vindictive partners” of provisions within the Domestic Violence Act, after “partners” she adds “[read women]”. This is an extraordinary liberty and a crass distortion of the point I was making. The potential for abuse of the Act is obvious, but it is also clear that it can be abused equally by both sexes. I wrote that section with this in mind and to suggest I meant something else is presumptuous in the extreme. In fact it illustrates more clearly than anything, the skewed and prejudicial way in which Buckingham has approached my work.  

Conclusion
Buckingham concludes by reiterating her baseless claim that enthusiastic acceptance of my ideas by the New Zealand media has led to them being “readily incorporated into dominant belief systems”. The impact of this on an unsuspecting populace has been to “limit public understandings of domestic violence and gender inequality in New Zealand”. She continues in this vein to the end, scolding me as an irresponsible sciolist who, under the pretence of scholarship, has drawn attention away from the plight of women in our society and contributed towards a trivialisation of violence against them, thus adversely affecting the potential development of public policy.
	Buckingham’s arguments come from a school of doctrinaire feminism which attempts to discredit contrasting points of view by focusing on decontextualised fragments of an offending author’s work. In my own case, because I have opinions that contrast with their own rigid interpretations of the world, critics in the past have presented these views as indicative of my entire ethos and attempted to assassinate  my academic character with brash allegations of poor scholarship (see, for example, Jordan, 2000; Kingi, 2000; and Walters, 2000a; 2000b. See also my response in Newbold, 2000). 
	Buckingham has done the same, but in attempting to attack me in toto, she has gone even further. I have written six books and over 50 articles and book chapters covering a variety of topics. I have given literally hundreds of media interviews, also on a variety of subjects. But in her attack on my credibility, Buckingham has elected to focus on a very small part of just one of my books and a tiny selection of printed excerpts from newspaper interviews. She has ignored the large body of my work and, more importantly, she has overlooked material within the one book she does refer to that would have moderated the extremist position she assigns to me. She has accused me of wrongly citing a newspaper report, when in fact the mistake was hers. She has accused me of giving a “wildly inaccurate” account of a newspaper report, when the inaccuracy was her own. She has misconstrued cases, misinterpreted my opinions, attributed meanings to things I have written that are not there, and arrogantly presumed, when our views of situations and outcomes conflict, that she is right and I am wrong. I may see things differently from her, but that does not justify the use of falsehood, distortion, rhetoric, hyperbole, and unsubstantiated claims, to present me and my work in an unauthentic light. 
The article she has written, in my judgement, is a grotesque example of polemical defacement that has no place in academic discourse. Moreover, while I am grateful to the editor for giving me this chance to reply, I feel that my time and the precious space of the Journal could have been much better spent on the development of constructive research, than in airing this pointless defence against a callow and jaundiced reviewer.                
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